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Abstract
In today’s global economy, a noticeable trend is that the
traditional state-law-centred legal framework is increasingly
challenged by self-regulatory private orders. Commercial
norms, commercial arbitration and social sanctions at the
international level have become important alternatives to
national laws, national courts and legal sanctions at the
national level. Consisting of transnational commercial
norms, both codified and uncodified, and legal norms, both
national and international, a plural regime for the gover-
nance of transnational commercial transactions has emerged
and developed in the past few decades. This article explores
the interaction between various kinds of norms in this
regime, identifies the effects of this interaction on the gov-
ernance of transnational commercial transactions and shows
the challenges to this interaction at the current stage. The
central argument of this article is that the interaction
between social and legal norms, namely incorporation and
internalisation, and the three effects derived from incorpora-
tion and internalisation, namely systematisation, harmonisa-
tion and compliance enhancement, are evident at both the
national and international levels. In particular, the emer-
gence of codified transnational commercial norms that are
positioned in the middle of the continuum between national
legal norms and uncodified transnational commercial norms
has brought changes to the interaction within the interna-
tional dimension. Although the development of codified
transnational commercial norms faces several challenges at
the moment, it can be expected that these norms will play
an increasingly important role in the future governance of
transnational commercial transactions.
Keywords: Incorporation and internalisation, transnational
commercial transactions, transnational commercial norms
1 Introduction
In today’s global economy, transnational commercial
norms (social norms in transnational commercial trans-
actions) play an increasingly important role in transna-
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tional commercial transactions.1 This trend has been
identified and discussed in a vast body of literature,
especially on the topic of the lex mercatoria (the Law
Merchant).2 Transnational commercial norms, such as
trade usages and commercial customs, are frequently
referred to by arbitrators when interpreting legal provi-
sions and contractual terms.3 It is also found that trans-
national commercial norms, for example the UNI-
DROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts (UNIDROIT Principles), are directly designated
by disputing parties as the governing rules for deciding
transnational commercial disputes.4 As an important
alternative to national legal norms, transnational com-
mercial norms have become an indispensable part of the
governance of transnational commercial transactions.5
The development of transnational commercial norms is
closely connected with the principles of party autonomy
and freedom of contract.6 The promotion of these two
principles by modern states provides transnational mer-
chants with considerable freedom in designing their
contracts according to their own specific needs and
1. The term ‘transnational commercial norms’ is used in this article to refer
to social norms generated from transnational mercantile practice. Strict-
ly speaking, ‘transnational commercial norms’ and lex mercatoria are
not interchangeable terms, though their meaning and scope are similar
to each other. For terminology and the connection between these two
terms, see A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, ‘The Lex Mercatoria and Internation-
al Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?’, 14
American University International Law Review 657, at 660-70 (1999).
2. For the debate on lex mercatoria, see generally K.P. Berger, The Creep-
ing Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria (2010). See also R.
Michaels, ‘The True Lex Mercatoria: Law beyond the State’, 14 Indiana
Journal of Global Legal Studies 447 (2007). M.L. Musttill, ‘The New
Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-Five Years’, 4 Arbitration Internation-
al 86 (1988).
3. C.R. Drahozal, ‘Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration’, 33 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law 79, at 133 (2000). The sources of transnational commercial norms
are further discussed in Section 4.3.
4. K.P. Berger, ‘International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts’, 46 The American Journal of
Comparative Law 129, at 143-49 (1998); Drahozal (2000), above n. 3,
at 128.
5. The term ‘governance’ is used in law and economics literature to refer
to the regulatory control over transnational commercial transactions in a
general sense. See e.g. G.P. Calliess and M. Renner, ‘Between Law and
Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance’, 22 Ratio Juris 260
(2009); A.S. Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Gover-
nance’, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627 (2006).
6. B. Cremades and S. Plehn, ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmoni-
zation of the Laws of the International Commercial Transactions’, 2
Boston University International Law Review 317, at 328 (1984).
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selecting their preferred governing laws and dispute res-
olution mechanisms accordingly. The parties can, one
the one hand, rely on public mechanisms and resolve
contract disputes in national courts on the basis of
national legal norms, while, on the other hand, they can
also use private mechanisms and settle contract disputes
in international arbitration institutions on the basis of
transnational commercial norms.7 Moreover, the two
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but can be
jointly employed by the parties in a mixed manner. Sim-
ply stated, private and public mechanisms are not only
competing but also complementing with each other in
the fields of norm production, dispute resolution and
contract enforcement, which create a ‘hybrid’ legal
regime for governing transnational commercial transac-
tions.8 In this context, it is necessary to reconsider the
interaction between the norms in this regime and their
roles in the governance of transnational commercial
transactions.
This article explores the interaction between transna-
tional commercial norms, both codified and uncodified,
and legal norms, both national and international, in the
field of transnational commercial transactions,9 and aims
to answer the following question: how do transnational
commercial norms and legal norms interact with each
other, and how can the interaction affect the governance
of transnational commercial transactions?10 To approach
this issue, the general strategy of this article is to first
develop a theoretical framework based on the law and
economics theories regarding the creation and enforce-
7. G.P. Calliess, W. Konradi, H. Nieswandt, F.P. Sosa & T. Dietz, ‘Transfor-
mations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Certainty for Global-
ized Exchange Processes?’, in A. Hurrelmann, S. Leibfried, K. Martens &
P. Mayer (eds.), Transforming the Golden Age Nation State (2007) 83,
at 83-108.
8. G. Teubner, ‘Hybrid Laws: Constitutionalizing Private Governance Net-
works’, in R. Kagan, M. Krygier & K. Winston (eds.), Legality and Com-
munity: On the Intellectual Legacy of Philip Selznick (2002) 311, at
311-31. See also G.P. Calliess, ‘The Making of Transnational Contract
Law’, 14 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 469, at 469-83
(2007); Sweet, above n. 5, at 627-46; P. Zumbansen, ‘Piercing the
Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law’, 8 European
Law Journal 400, at 400-32 (2002); F.K. Juenger, ‘The Lex Mercatoria
and Private International Law’, 60 Louisiana Law Review 1133, at
1133-1150 (2000).
9. The categorisation of norms in transnational commercial transactions is
further discussed in Section 3.3.
10. Apart from the focus of this article (the effects of the interaction
between the norms in transnational commercial transactions), law and
economics approaches are also used to analyse other important issues
regarding this interaction. These issues cover norm evolution, norm
competition and the pros and cons of harmonisation. For norm evolu-
tion, see e.g. J.S. Kraus, ‘Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial
Norms’, 26 The Journal of Legal Studies 377 (1997); B.L. Benson, ‘The
Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law’, 55 Southern Economic
Journal 644 (1989). For norm competition, see e.g. S. Vogenauer, ‘Reg-
ulatory Competition through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of
Forum in Europe: Theory and Evidence’, 1 European Review of Private
Law 13 (2013); G. Ruhl, ‘The Choice of Law Framework for Efficient
Regulatory Competition in Contract Law’, in H. Eidenmuller (ed.), Regu-
latory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution (2013)
287. For the pros and cons of harmonisation, see e.g. F. Gomez, ‘The
Harmonization of Contract Law through European Rules: A Law and
Economics Perspective’, 4 European Review of Contract Law 89 (2008);
G. Wagner, ‘The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case of Contract
Law’, 3 ERA Forum 77 (2002).
ment of social and legal norms and their interaction at
the national level, and then apply these theories to the
international level to analyse the interaction between
transnational commercial norms and legal norms in the
context of transnational commercial transactions.11
Following the Introduction, Part 2 illustrates how social
and legal norms are generated and enforced, how social
and legal norms interact with each other through incor-
poration and internalisation, and how the three effects
derived from incorporation and internalisation, namely
systematisation, harmonisation, and compliance
enhancement, can reduce the cost of norm usage,
enhance norm enforcement and unify individuals’ dif-
ferent opinions. Part 3 reviews how different kinds of
norms in transnational commercial transactions emerged
and developed in history, how they form a continuum
between uncodified transnational commercial norms
and national legal norms and how codified transnational
commercial norms are positioned in this continuum.
Part 4 applies the theories generalised in Part 2 to the
context of transnational mercantile practice, and studies
the interaction between the norms in transnational com-
mercial transactions identified in Part 3. Particularly,
Part 4 illustrates the important role of codified transna-
tional commercial norms in this interaction and the
challenges this interaction is facing at the current stage.
The article then concludes with a few thoughts on the
future development of this interaction and the role of
codified transnational commercial norms in the future
governance of transnational commercial transactions.
2 Social and Legal Norms: A
Law and Economics
Perspective
2.1 Creation and Enforcement of Social and
Legal Norms: Private and Public
Mechanisms
2.1.1 Social Norms and Private Mechanisms
The creation of social norms can be understood as a
process of gradual emergence of consensus between
11. To the author’s knowledge, there is still no comprehensive theoretical
framework that is specifically designed to illustrate the interaction
between the norms in transnational commercial transactions. Hence,
this article adopts an alternative approach that starts with a general the-
oretical framework developed on the basis of the interaction between
social and legal norms at the national level, and then applies the general
theories at the national level in the context of transnational commercial
transactions. But some related theoretical discussion is helpful for
understanding the governance of transnational commercial transactions.
See generally G. Cunieberti, ‘Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria’, 52
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 369, at 369-434 (2014); Voge-
nauer, above n. 10, at 13-78; Ruhl, above n. 10, at 287-303; M.A. Pet-
sche, ‘International Commercial Arbitration and the Transformation of
the Conflict of Laws Theory’, 18 Michigan State Journal of Internation-
al Law 454, at 454-93 (2010).
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members of a community.12 Individuals naturally have
certain judgements, normally in the form of approval or
disapproval, upon certain behaviour and may react to
the behaviour by rewarding or punishing the actor.13
These judgements and reactions reflect the general atti-
tude of community members towards the behaviour.
When the majority of community members reach a con-
sensus on whether certain behaviour should be encour-
aged or prohibited, social norms are then generated.14 In
brief, social norms can be understood as rules of behav-
iour. They inform community members whether certain
behaviour is appropriate or not in a community.15
From a law and economics perspective, individuals fol-
low social norms in light of different incentives. These
incentives can be roughly divided into two categories:
mental or material.16 Some social norms are normative
and supported mainly by mental incentives. These
social norms are derived from the collective ‘normative
attitudes’ of community members.17 Some attitudes
such as the opposition to murder, rape or child aban-
donment are deeply held by most people, while other
opinions such as an aversion to impoliteness, unpunc-
tuality and unruliness are expressed in a relatively mild
manner. Be they strong or weak, individuals follow
these kinds of social norms because conforming to these
social norms increases their mental utility or violating
these social norms reduces their mental utility. For
example, they may feel guilty or ashamed or be blamed
by others for not fulfilling these obligations. Individuals
may even follow standards that go beyond the basic
behaviour requirements to feel proud or to obtain praise
from others. In general, guilt, pride, esteem, disapproval
and shame are the main mental incentives that motivate
12. R.A. Posner and E.B. Rasmusen, ‘Creating and Enforcing Norms, with
Special Reference to Sanctions’, 19 International Review of Law and
Economics 369, at 2 (1999). As social norms may vary from community
to community, this article uses the term ‘community members’ to
emphasise that social norms are collectively created and enforced by
individuals in a certain community. The size or the scope of communi-
ties also varies. It can be as small as a family, a neighbourhood or a
club. It can also be as large as a city, a country or the whole human
society.
13. E.A. Posner, ‘Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms’, 144 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1697, at 1699 (1996). Sometimes, individu-
als may also react to their own behaviour. For example, a person who
thinks his or her own behaviour is inappropriate, may feel guilty or
ashamed. This issue is further discussed in the following paragraphs of
this section.
14. R.D. Cooter, ‘Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A
Model of Decentralized Law’, 14 International Review of Law and Eco-
nomics 215, at 224 (1994).
15. Many law and economics scholars use ‘norms’ to refer to social norms
and ‘law’ for legal norms. But there is also some law and economics lit-
erature that explicitly uses the term ‘social norms’. See e.g. E.A. Posner,
‘The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts’, 36 University
of Richmond Law Review 465 (2002); E.A. Posner, ‘Standards, Rules,
and Social Norms’, 21 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 101, at
101-17 (1997).
16. In McAdams and Rasmusen’s discussion, these two kinds of social
norms are termed ‘norms’ and ‘conventions’. R.H. McAdams and E.B.
Rasmusen, ‘Norms and the Law’, in M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (eds.),
Handbook of Law and Economics (2007) 1537, at 1577-1578.
17. Posner and Rasmusen, above n. 12, at 372-76.
individuals to follow social norms in light of mental
incentives.18
Individuals may also comply with social norms for the
sake of material utility. They do so not because they
normatively deem certain behaviour appropriate or not,
but because following these social norms can bring them
material gains or avoid unnecessary losses. There are
three important economic models that explain why
social norms are followed by individuals in light of
material incentives, namely the coordination game mod-
el, the repeated games model and the signalling model.19
The coordination game model indicates how individuals
can avoid unnecessary losses by following coordination
norms. For example, in the classic car-driving example,
drivers follow the same traffic rule of driving on left or
right to avoid car crashes.20 This model is also useful for
explaining why merchants tend to follow unified techni-
cal standards in trade. The repeated games model shows
that individuals are inclined to cooperate with each oth-
er rather than cheat in a long-term relationship, as the
one-off gain from cheating is normally outweighed by
potential future gains from following cooperative norms
in repeated games.21 By the same token, merchants are
motivated to comply with contractual terms instead of
violating them to preserve future cooperation opportu-
nities with their partners in repeated transactions.
Accordingly, in the signalling model, individuals use
signalling norms to inform others that they are long-
time ‘cooperators’ instead of one-round ‘cheaters’, as
the cost of following signalling norms outweighs the
18. McAdams and Rasmusen, above n. 16, at 1579-1580.
19. There are also other theoretical models applicable to social norms, the
cascade model for example. See generally S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshlei-
fer & I. Welch, ‘A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural
Change as Informational Cascades’, 100 Journal of Political Economy
992 (1992). But since other theoretical models are not closely connec-
ted to the discussion in this article, they are not discussed in detail.
20. If there were no traffic rules regulating which side to drive on, drivers
would need to slow down and even communicate with each other to
make sure they both drive on the left or right to avoid car crashes. But it
would be too time-consuming if drivers needed to agree on a tempora-
ry solution for which side to drive on whenever they met other cars on
the road. Thus, it is necessary for drivers to follow a unified traffic rule
that prescribes that all drivers should drive on the left or right. This kind
of traffic rules are typical coordination norms. Individuals are motivated
to follow coordination norms to avoid unnecessary material losses and
save the time for seeking a temporary solution. See Posner (1997),
above n. 15, at 110.
21. In repeated games, generally speaking, one participant should cooper-
ate with the other participant unless the other participant cheated in the
previous round. The reason why the tit-for-tat strategy is the best
option in repeated games can be explained by game theory. A short
explanation is that if one participant tries to cheat in the game, he or
she may lose the opportunity of further cooperation and thus lose
potential future gains. This is especially true when there are other candi-
dates who can replace the participant who cheated in the game. Cooter
(1994), above n. 14, at 218-20. Posner (1997), above n. 15, at 108.
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gains that a cheater can make from cheating in one-
round transactions.22
2.1.2 Legal Norms and Public Mechanisms
Similarly to social norms, legal norms also serve to
guide individuals’ behaviour.23 But, different from
social norms, which are mainly created and enforced by
community members themselves,24 the creation and
enforcement of legal norms are mainly dependent on
legislative, administrative and judicial organs.25 In civil
law tradition, legal norms are established by legislators
in the form of statutory laws, while judges in common
law tradition produce legal norms through their deci-
sions, the aggregation of which then gradually becomes
judicial precedents and common law doctrines.26 By the
same token, one major, if not the most important, incen-
tive for individuals to follow legal norms is the fear of
legal sanctions imposed by state organs.
As two different kinds of norms relying on private or
public mechanisms, social and legal norms have differ-
ent strengths and drawbacks. On the one hand, social
norms are relatively general, ambiguous and flexible.
They rarely provide clear and definite guidance to indi-
viduals on behaviour requirements and potential sanc-
tions.27 Compared with social norms, legal norms are
normally more precise, explicit and coercive.28 On the
other hand, the creation and enforcement of legal norms
generally incur more cost than social norms. The estab-
lishment and maintenance of public institutions and leg-
islative, administrative and judicial activities are all
resource-consuming. Compared with legal norms, the
creation and enforcement of social norms are spontane-
ously conducted by community members themselves
22. In real life, it is difficult for merchants to find enough information to
ascertain whether a potential trader is a cooperator or a cheater. Signal-
ling behaviour is a common solution to this problem. Specifically, signal-
ling behaviour is normally costly and outweighs the short-run gains that
a cheater can make from cheating in one round transaction. Thus, only
cooperators who aim at long-term gains are willing to take costly sig-
nalling actions. In other words, signalling behaviour can be regarded as
a signal that informs other merchants of the willingness of the actor to
establish long-term cooperation. For example, traditional diamond mer-
chants in the United States must draft their contracts with a particular
style of contracting, which consumed considerable time and money to
learn. One needed to bear this cost to send signals to other diamond
merchants that he or she would be a credible partner in the diamond
trade. See E.A. Posner, ‘Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics
and the Law’, 27 The Journal of Legal Studies 765, at 768 (1998); Pos-
ner (1997), above n. 15, at 109-10.
23. R.A. Posner, ‘Social Norms and the Law: A Economic Approach’, 87 The
American Economic Review 365, at 365-69 (1997).
24. Posner and Rasmusen, above n. 12, at 369-70.
25. Ibid. The creation and enforcement of legal norms is further elaborated
in Section 2.2.
26. R. Pound, ‘Common Law and Legislation’, 21 Harvard Law Review 383,
at 404-6 (1908).
27. For example, how quiet is quiet enough in the library? The answer may
vary from person to person. Even if one person speaks really loudly so
that all the people in the library agree to punish him or her, what should
be the sanctions? No definitive answers can be given. See Posner and
Rasmusen, above n. 12, at 369-71.
28. Ibid.
and are thus generally less costly.29 But, as shown in the
following section, the creation and enforcement of social
and legal norms are closely connected with each other.
Many legal norms have their roots in social norms,
while some social norms are also derived from legal
norms.30 More importantly, the interaction between
social and legal norms can diminish their differences
and creates a common basis for them to complement
each other in guiding individuals’ behaviour and main-
taining social order.
2.2 Interaction between Social and Legal Norms:
Incorporation and Internalisation
2.2.1 Incorporation
Social norms can turn into legal norms through the pro-
cess of incorporation. The origins of many legal norms
in statutory laws can be found in social norms. It is com-
mon to find that legislators study existing social norms
and selectively incorporate them into national laws.31
Similarly to legal norms in statutory laws, many legal
norms in common law doctrines are also the products of
the incorporation process. In common law tradition,
judges follow established common law doctrines to
decide cases. When there are no applicable pre-existing
common law doctrines, judges then need to rely on their
‘sense of justice’ to reach a decision.32 In doing so, they
tend to observe social practice and discover existing
social norms as the basis of decisions. These decisions
that are essentially created on the basis of social practice
and social norms then gradually turn into judicial prece-
dents and common law doctrines. From this perspec-
tive, legal norms in common law doctrines are actually
incorporated social norms derived from judges’ intellec-
tual refinement.33
The incorporation process reflects a bottom-up
approach to law-making, through which selected social
norms become more coercive and systematic. Specifical-
ly, when selected social norms are incorporated into
29. Cooter summarises these differences between social and legal norms as
their ‘complementary strengths’ for maintaining social order. Some
kinds of behaviour, such as keeping quiet in the library, following a
queue or cleaning tables after a meal, are more suitable for social norms
to govern, for it would be too costly for legal norms to govern them.
Correspondingly, some kinds of behaviour, such as murder, robbery and
theft, should be governed mainly by legal norms, for they need to be
subject to strict control. R.D. Cooter, ‘Three Effects of Social Norms on
Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization’, 79 Oregon Law
Review 1, at 21-22 (2000).
30. It should be noted that the terms ‘incorporation’ and ‘internalization’
are not necessarily used to describe the interaction between social and
legal norms in the literature. See e.g. K. Rittich, ‘The Future of Law and
Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the
Social’, 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 199 (2004); A. Etzio-
ni, ‘Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History’, 34 Law &
Society Review 157 (2000).
31. R. Michaels, ‘The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice
of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism’, 51 The Wayne
Law Review 1209, at 1232 (2005). R.D. Cooter, ‘Decentralized Law for
a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New
Law Merchant’, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1643, at
1651 (1996).
32. Posner (1996), above n. 13, at 1699.
33. Cooter (1996), above n. 31, at 1648.
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legal norms, they also gain the legal authority and coer-
cion from state power. After incorporation, individuals
follow these norms not only to avoid social sanctions but
also for fear of state violence.34 Moreover, individuals
need to spend time and energy in recognising norms
before using them. Such cost is reduced when originally
vague, unwritten and fragmented social norms that are
relatively difficult to find and learn turn into precise,
written and coherent legal norms that can be readily
used. In brief, the systematisation effect makes it easier
and less costly for individuals to use these incorporated
norms.
2.2.2 Internalisation
Another form of the interaction between social and legal
norms is internalisation. Not all legal norms are created
on the basis of existing social norms. There are several
reasons for states to directly establish new legal norms
through legislation. First, from a law and economics
perspective, social norms are likely to be ‘undercreated
and underenforced’ as no one can find direct interest
from creating and enforcing social norms.35 According-
ly, vacancies that are not covered by social norms need
to be fulfilled by legal norms. Second, the generation of
social norms is normally a gradual process that may take
years to realise. It is possible that social norms cannot
timely respond to new developments in society. Third,
some social norms, duelling and lynch for example, are
‘bad’ norms that need to be changed.36 Fourth, social
norms are not necessarily efficient or optimal.37 Last,
states may also establish new legal norms based on poli-
cy goals.
These newly established legal norms normally have no
solid root in social norms. But they can be gradually
internalised by individuals and turn into social norms
over time.38 To illustrate, assume that there are no well-
accepted social norms against smoking in public places.
Some individuals may deem smoking in public places as
misbehaviour, while others may consider the issue as
merely a personal choice. A government may directly
issue a regulation to prohibit smoking in public places
for the concern of public health. Initially, some individ-
uals may just stop smoking in public places because of
the threat of legal punishment, though they still insist
that whether or not to smoke in public places is a per-
sonal choice. But the compulsory compliance with the
new legal norm, as well as the increasing social pressure
from others, may gradually destabilise the insistence.
Over time, there will be more and more individuals
accepting the new rule that smoking is not appropriate
in public places. Consequently, this new legal norm will
be ultimately internalised by the majority and turn into
a social norm. Even if this rule is not enforced by state
officials, individuals will still follow this rule to avoid
potential social sanctions. They may feel ashamed or
34. Posner (1997), above n. 23, at 367-69.
35. Posner and Rasmusen, above n. 12, at 370.
36. Posner (1996), above n. 13, at 1736-1740.
37. Kraus, above n. 10, at 411.
38. Cooter (1996), above n. 31, at 1642-1643.
guilty when they smoke in public places. Others may
also remind them to follow the new ‘social’ norm or
even force them to stop smoking in public places with
actions.
The internalisation process reflects a top-down
approach to law-making. Through internalisation, a
social foundation of newly established legal norms will
be gradually developed in a community, which leads to
an increase in the acceptance of and compliance with
these internalised norms by community members. The
cost of norm enforcement is thus reduced with the sup-
port of social sanctions. Furthermore, the internalisation
process is also useful for harmonising different opinions
of individuals. As shown in the smoking example previ-
ously, the promulgation of the new rule against smoking
in public places influences the views of individuals on
smoking and actually unifies originally opposite opin-
ions. Thus, to some extent, the harmonisation effect of
internalisation can help to reduce the disagreements
between individuals, enable them to interact with each
other more smoothly and thus reduce the unnecessary
cost caused by disputes in social life.
3 Social and Legal Norms in
Transnational Commercial
Transactions
The interaction between social and legal norms not only
exists at the national level but also occurs between the
national and international dimensions. As discussed in
the following sections, the rise of medieval lex mercatoria
and its later incorporation into national laws in the early
modern era is one example of the interaction between
transnational commercial norms and national legal
norms. The development of both social and legal norms
in the field of transnational mercantile practice in past
decades has significantly pluralised the regulatory
framework for transnational commercial transactions.
Various kinds of norms in this plural regime can be
roughly categorised as national and international legal
norms and uncodified and codified transnational com-
mercial norms depending on whether the norms con-
cerned are created and enforced by public or private
mechanisms.39
3.1 Transnational Commercial Transactions: A
Historical Perspective
In medieval times, transnational commercial norms
played an important role in the governance of transna-
tional commercial transactions. Since the eleventh cen-
tury, commercial activities have experienced a signifi-
cant upsurge in Europe. The range of commercial trans-
actions has rapidly expanded from inter-town business
39. As discussed in Section 3.4, it is difficult to draw a neat line of the
norms in transnational commercial transactions. Thus, for the purpose
of this article, they are roughly separated here on the basis of their crea-
tion and enforcement mechanisms.
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to cross-border trade. However, the development of
cross-border commercial transactions has also brought
problems to medieval merchants. Since merchants from
different regions and countries normally had different
trade usages and commercial customs, a set of unified
exchange rules were needed to facilitate cross-border
trade.40 These practical needs, as well as the cosmopoli-
tan nature of transnational commercial transactions, hel-
ped medieval merchants to diminish the differences
between mercantile practices. Through repeated trans-
national commercial transactions, transnational com-
mercial norms were gradually generated, unified and
accepted by medieval merchants in Europe, which con-
stituted the basis of the medieval lex mercatoria.
It should be noted that these transnational commercial
norms were not produced by state organs, but devel-
oped by the community of medieval merchants.41 The
enforcement of these transnational commercial norms
also relied mainly on the community of merchants.
Medieval merchants established self-regulating institu-
tions to enforce their commercial norms. With the sup-
port of these institutions, transnational commercial
norms were ‘voluntarily produced, voluntarily adjudica-
ted and voluntarily enforced’ by medieval merchants in
Europe.42 Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean
that the medieval lex mercatoria, or, more precisely,
transnational commercial norms at that time, were a
complete set of norms that were sufficient for covering
all the mercantile practice in medieval Europe. The
usage of the medieval lex mercatoria could not be separa-
ted from local laws because of its insufficiency in pro-
viding detailed and precise legal guidance.43 More
importantly, the development of the medieval lex merca-
toria also relied on the revival of law as a scholarship and
the emergence of trained legal specialists, which played
an important role in the promotion of cross-border trade
in medieval Europe.44
In the early modern era, the reinforcement of state pow-
er has led to a legal reform in Europe.45 National laws
began to take over the role of the medieval lex mercatoria
in the governance of transnational commercial transac-
tions. Many states chose to selectively incorporate exist-
ing transnational commercial norms into their commer-
cial codes. Examples were the Napoleon’s Code de
Commerce, the German Uniform Commercial Code
and the Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States.46 Although the medieval lex mercatoria had grad-
40. P.R. Milgrom, D.C. North & B.R. Weingast, ‘The Role of Institutions in
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs’, 2 Economics and Politics 1, at 4-6 (1990).
41. N.E. Hatzimihail, ‘The Many Lives-and Faces of Lex Mercatoria: History
as Genealogy in International Business Law’, 71 Law and Contemporary
Problems 169, at 177 (2008).
42. Benson, above n. 10, at 647.
43. C.W. Fassberg, ‘Lex Mercatoria – Hoist with Its Own Petard?’, 5 Chica-
go Journal of International Law 67, at 68 (2004).
44. H.-B. Schafer and A.J. Wulf, ‘Jurists, Clerics, and Merchants: The Rise of
Learned Law in Medieval Europe and Its Impact on Economic Growth’,
11 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 266, at 298-300 (2014).
45. Benson, above n. 10, at 651-52; J.H. Berman, Law and Revolution: The
Formation of Western Legal Tradition (1983), at 341-42.
46. Michaels (2005), above n. 31, at 1232.
ually come to an end in the codification movement,
transnational commercial norms themselves did not
vanish. Instead, particularly selected transnational com-
mercial norms were refined through the codification
efforts of states and persisted in a more systematic man-
ner in national laws.
3.2 National and International Legal Norms in
Transnational Commercial Transactions
In the codification movement, once unified transnation-
al commercial norms were localised to adapt to the spe-
cific conditions of different countries.47 This change
threw up a new question: which country’s law should be
applied in a cross-border transaction?
3.2.1 National Legal Norms
One traditional solution to this question is the private
international law approach. Based on choice-of-law
rules, the law of a specific country will be applied to
govern a transnational commercial transaction.48 This
approach, however, has several shortcomings. On the
one hand, the usage of this approach may be costly, con-
sidering the potential time and cost for the parties to
find and study foreign laws and the possible expenses
for translations.49 The parties may also need to face
unpredictable risk caused by unfamiliarity with foreign
laws.50 On the other hand, this approach also cannot
fully satisfy transnational merchants’ needs for certainty
and predictability. A transnational commercial contract
may be signed, performed, modified or terminated in
different countries. This transnational nature of cross-
border transactions renders it difficult to ascertain the
jurisdiction of courts and the applicable choice-of-law
rules. As argued by Juenger, the ‘methodological uncer-
tainties’ and ‘inherent difficulties’ of a private interna-
tional law approach to cross-border mercantile practice
inevitably lead to difficulties in guaranteeing certainty
and predictability in transnational commercial transac-
tions.51
To reduce unpredictability and uncertainty, the princi-
ple of party autonomy has been increasingly emphasised
in modern theories of private international law and in
the practice of transnational commercial transactions.52
Based on the principle of party autonomy, contracting
parties can directly designate a specific country’s law as
the governing rules of their contracts so that the prob-
47. Fassberg, above n. 43, at 72.
48. Juenger, above n. 8, at 1133.
49. Maniruzzaman, above n. 1, at 658; Sweet, above n. 5, at 631.
50. For example, when the parties select a third country’s law that they are
unfamiliar with, they may make incorrect predictions on the legal con-
sequences of their actions, which may lead to unnecessary risk and cost
in the processes of contract performance and dispute resolution. Pet-
sche, above n. 11, at 464-66; P. Hachem and I. Schwenzer, ‘The CISG –
Successes and Pitfalls’, 57 The American Journal of Comparative Law
457, at 457-78 (2009).
51. Juenger, above n. 8, at 1136-1140.
52. M. Zhang, ‘Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective
of Contractual Choice of Law’, 20 Emory International Law Review
511, at 560-61 (2006); R. Engle, ‘Party Autonomy in International Arbi-
tration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to Predictability’, 15 The Transna-
tional Lawyer 323, at 334-40 (2002).
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lem of uncertainty and unpredictability can be tackled.
However, the introduction of the party autonomy prin-
ciple still cannot provide an effective solution to the
potentially high cost of finding and studying foreign
laws.53 Besides, national laws, which are essentially
designed for domestic transactions, have been criticised
to be ineffective for governing transnational commercial
transactions.54 Domestic legislators generally pay more
attention to domestic commercial practice and cannot
always adequately respond to the specific needs of trans-
national merchants.55 Some domestic policies are also
somewhat superfluous in the context of transnational
commercial transactions.56
More importantly, national laws also cannot fully satisfy
transnational merchants’ needs of neutrality. Empirical
statistics have shown that the parties prefer to select
their home country laws with which they are more
familiar.57 Accordingly, the parties may disagree on
what law to choose, as each side wants to persuade the
other to follow its own home country laws, which is
quite common when the bargaining power between
them is equal. As a result, an alternative choice that is
more acceptable for both parties is to select a ‘neutral
law’, a third country’s law, for example. But, as men-
tioned, using a third country’s law can be costly.
Besides, even using a third country’s law may still raise
parties’ concerns for neutrality, especially when trading
parties come from different legal traditions. For exam-
ple, which country’s law is neutral for the parties from
China and the United States in a Sino-US commercial
transaction? British law can be an option considering its
popular usage in international trade.58 But the Chinese
side may still be reluctant to accept the suggestion of
using British law, as the American side is probably more
familiar with British law than the Chinese side.
3.2.2 International Legal Norms
A unified set of supranational legal norms can be an
effective solution to the aforementioned deficiencies of
national laws in the governance of transnational com-
mercial transactions. However, the absence of a supra-
national government and required authority to impose
53. See above n. 49 and the accompanying text.
54. Petsche, above n. 11, at 458-75; Maniruzzaman, above n. 1, at 658.
55. Petsche claimed that there are mainly three types of restrictions for
transnational commercial transactions in domestic laws: ‘restrictions on
the parties’ ability to address questions arising only in the international
context, restrictions on the possibility for the parties to effectively
respond to the needs of increasingly complex transactions, and restric-
tions based on legislative policies aimed at protecting weaker parties’.
Petsche, above n. 11, at 471-76; Maniruzzaman, above n. 1, at 631.
56. For example, an emphasis on the protection of weaker parties, such as
consumers, is a reasonable policy in domestic context, while this policy
is not that necessary for transitional merchants, which may lead to
restrictions in transnational commercial transactions. Berger (2010),
above n. 2, at 15-16; Petsche, above n. 11, at 474.
57. There are a number of empirical surveys that show home country laws
are normally the primary choices for transnational merchants. For a
summary of these empirical findings, see Vogenauer, above n. 10, at
36-60.
58. British law is a popular choice for transnational merchants when they
prefer a third country’s national law as the governing law of their con-
tracts. See below n. 88 and the accompanying text.
cross-border legal sanctions renders it unrealistic to find
a set of supranational legal norms that are truly compul-
sorily followed by all transnational merchants. Instead,
international legal norms in international treaties that
emerged in the last century have partly served the role
of supranational legal norms. In a strict sense, these
international legal norms are not directly legally binding
as national legal norms. But, as will be shown in the dis-
cussion that follows, their potential in unifying national
legal norms of different countries still merits attention.
This ambitious project of the unification of national
laws was started by the International Institute for the
Unification of Private law (UNIDROIT) in 1929.59 The
general idea was to unify different national laws with an
international legal framework consisting of multiple
international treaties.60 Specifically, international trea-
ties are binding on the states that have signed and rati-
fied them, and member states are thus under the obliga-
tions to implement treaty provisions and introduce cor-
responding international legal norms into their national
laws. As a result, if a set of international treaties regulat-
ing transnational commercial transactions can be ratified
by enough countries, the international legal norms in
these treaties will then become common rules for trans-
national commercial transactions over time.61
But this route of unifying national laws through interna-
tional treaties is difficult to follow. It is not easy to build
consensus between countries, considering their diverse
legal traditions and economic development status. The
initial attempt at unification in 1964 was relatively
unsuccessful. Only a limited number of states ratified
the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
(ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(ULFC).62 Later, in 1968, the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) started
a new attempt and finally achieved a more encouraging
result: the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This treaty has
been signed by eighty-three states by now.63
The relative success of CISG, however, comes at a cost.
The drafters of CISG had to not only study transnation-
al mercantile practice and existing transnational com-
mercial norms, but also strike a balance between differ-
ent national legal provisions and diverging legislative
emphases behind them. As a result, CISG excluded sev-
eral important but controversial issues such as the valid-
ity of contracts (Art. 4) from its scope or used vague
terms such as ‘fundamental breach’ and ‘reasonable
59. K. Lipstein, ‘One Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private
International Law’, 42 The International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 553, at 554-57 (1993).
60. F. De Ly, ‘Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model’, 25
Journal of Law and Commerce 1, at 2 (2005).
61. Cremades and Plehn, above n. 6, at 321-22.
62. For a detailed introduction to the history of the unification efforts, see
M.J. Bonell, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and CISG – Alternatives or Complementary Instruments’, 1
Uniform Law Review 26, at 27-28 (1996).
63. See <www. uncitral. org/ uncitral/ en/ uncitral_ texts/ sale_ goods/ 1980
CISG_ status. html> (last visited 1 June 2015).
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length’ to regulate sensitive issues (Arts. 25, 47 and 63).
The limited scope and vagueness of CISG provisions
have been criticised by some scholars.64 To some extent,
international treaties such as CISG have to be relatively
vague and leave necessary room for national laws so that
they can be more influential among states and more
widely accepted by them. De Ly defines this compro-
mising approach as an ‘eclectic model’ that combines
both international treaty provisions and national laws
for the governance of transnational commercial transac-
tions.65
In general, although CISG is an important step towards
the unification of national laws, it is still far away from a
uniform international code for transnational commercial
transactions. The stateless nature of CISG-like interna-
tional treaties can respond to transnational merchants’
needs for neutrality. But, as discussed in the previous
paragraphs, international legal norms at the current
stage still face difficulties in providing sufficient and
detailed guidance for merchants in transnational com-
mercial transactions because of their relative vagueness
and restricted scope.
3.3 Transnational Commercial Norms
Given that national and international legal norms, to
some extent, cannot provide a fully satisfactory answer
for the governance of transnational commercial transac-
tions, transnational commercial norms, as a set of supra-
national social norms generated from transnational
mercantile practice, have drawn the attention of both
scholars and practitioners.66 These norms can be rough-
ly categorised as uncodified and codified transnational
commercial norms.67
3.3.1 Uncodified Transnational Commercial Norms:
Commercial Customs and Trade Usages
Some transnational commercial norms are unwritten or
at least uncodified. They can be roughly named in a col-
lective manner as commercial customs and trade usages
that are distilled from repeated transnational commer-
cial transactions and voluntarily followed by transna-
tional merchants even when they are not explicitly
specified in contracts.68 The scope of commercial norms
and trade usages is quite broad and can be rather gener-
al. Examples are the principles of pacta sunt servanda
and good faith. They can also be relatively specific. For
64. See e.g. Smits, ‘Problems of Uniform Sales Law – Why the CISG may
not Promote International Trade’, Maastricht European Private Law
Institute Working Paper 2013:1, at 6-9. There are also voices against
the criticism levelled at the CISG. See e.g. Hachem and Schwenzer,
above n. 50, at 467-78.
65. De Ly (2005), above n. 60, at 3. Besides, there is also empirical evi-
dence suggesting that CISG is not frequently referred to in transnational
commercial transactions. See below n. 96 and the accompanying text.
66. This is evident in the literature on modern lex mercatoria, see above n.
2.
67. For a general introduction to the sources of transnational commercial
norms, see Maniruzzaman, above n. 1, at 672-73. See also O. Lando,
‘The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration’, 34 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 747, at 747-68 (1985).
68. R. Goode, ‘Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law’,
46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, at 7 (1997).
example, contracting parties may not set a specific time
limit for the examination of bank documents in their
contracts, but they may still have a sense of reasonable
time limit in their minds.69 Although these examples
can be useful for understanding uncodified commercial
norms, it still seems difficult to precisely describe what
they are. As argued by Lord Musttill, commercial cus-
toms and trade usages are ‘simply a practice which is
generally followed’, and some principles are ‘so general
as to be useless’.70
Commercial customs and trade usages are frequently
reflected in standardised contractual terms and publish-
ed arbitration awards. In repeated commercial transac-
tions, certain contractual terms, such as the way of
transportation or the method of payment, are repeated
without significant changes in different contracts. Over
time, these contractual terms then gradually become
standardised, and the parties do not need to spend time
to negotiate the details of these standardised contractual
terms. Accordingly, these standardised contractual
terms then form one particular type of commercial cus-
toms and trade usages.71 It is common to find that con-
tracting parties simply follow these standardised con-
tractual terms so that they can focus more on the nego-
tiation of other contractual clauses such as price, quanti-
ty and quality that are more important for them.72
Published arbitration awards can also signal the recogni-
tion of commercial customs and trade usages. It is possi-
ble that a disputable issue is not specified in the contract
and the applicable law also does not provide enough
guidance for arbitrators to decide the disputable issue.
Empirical studies show that many arbitrators are con-
sciously using their understanding of commercial cus-
toms and trade usages to fill the aforementioned gap in
law when rendering arbitration awards.73 When similar
opinions are repeatedly found in published arbitration
awards on the disputable issue, a rough consensus could
then develop on the basis of these published arbitration
awards, which may gradually turn into commercial cus-
toms and trade usages when enough merchants and
arbitrators accept it.74 But it should be noted that in def-
erence to the traditional value of confidentiality in inter-
national commercial arbitration, most arbitration awards
are not published. Accordingly, the crystallisation of
uncodified transnational commercial norms based on
69. Ibid., at 12.
70. Musttill, above n. 2, at 92-94.
71. For example, if email is stated as a formal mean of notification in most
transnational commercial contracts, email will then naturally become
one of the formal communication methods in transnational commercial
transactions over time. Cremades and Plehn, above n. 6, at 347. See
also C.M. Schmitthoff, ‘The Unification or Harmonisation of Law by
Means of Standard Contracts and General Conditions’, 17 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 551, at 551-57 (1968).
72. Musttill, above n. 2, at 95; Berger (2010), above n. 2, at 284-86.
73. Cremades and Plehn, above n. 6, at 335-46.
74. Maniruzzaman, above n. 1, at 693-94.
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published arbitration awards is somewhat restricted in
practice.75
3.3.2 Codified Transnational Commercial Norms: Trade
Standards, Private Codification and Model Laws
Similarly to legislators at the national level, many inter-
national institutions function as the codifiers of transna-
tional commercial norms at the international level. Serv-
ing different purposes, transnational commercial norms
are codified in different kinds of regulatory documents.
These codified transnational commercial norms are not
legally binding in a strict sense, but are subject to the
voluntary compliance of transnational merchants in
principle. Depending on the nature of the international
institutions, there are mainly three kinds of codified
transnational commercial norms, namely trade stan-
dards, private codification and model laws.
Some international institutions, such as the Internation-
al Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Interna-
tional Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), general-
ise mercantile practice and issue unified trade standards
for transnational merchants.76 One influential example
of technical standards is the Incoterms (International
Commercial Terms) issued by ICC.77 Similarly to
standardised contractual terms, these technical stan-
dards can save merchants’ time and energy in contract
negotiation. Moreover, as shown in the coordination
game model, following unified standards can also avoid
unnecessary costs. For example, using the same com-
mercial terms can reduce the chances of misunderstand-
ings and accompanying losses caused by misunderstand-
ings. Besides, there are also many trade associations that
issue more specific trade association standards for asso-
ciation members in particular industries. It is notewor-
thy that association members normally have a strong
incentive to follow trade association standards. As
shown in the repeated games model, association mem-
bers are generally willing to maintain their reputation in
trade associations for securing further opportunities of
commercial transactions. Violating trade association
standards will damage their reputation in the association
and reduce other association members’ desire to trade
with them. Even without substantial sanctions, the
75. For related discussion, see e.g. A. Schmitz, ‘Untangling the Privacy Para-
dox in Arbitration’, 54 Kansas Law Review 1211, at 1211-1253 (2006);
C.G. Buys, ‘The Tensions Between Confidentiality and Transparency in
International Arbitration’, 14 The American Review of International
Arbitration 121, at 121-38 (2003).
76. For a detailed study on international institutions that are dedicated to
the codification of uncodified transnational commercial norms, see J.K.
Levit, ‘A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments’, 30 The Yale Journal of International
Law 125 (2005).
77. Incoterms provides a set of unified terms for transnational merchants to
more clearly and easily describe their rights and duties in contracts. For
an official introduction, available at: <www. iccwbo. org/ products -and -
services/ trade -facilitation/ incoterms -2010/ the -incoterms -rules/> (last
visited 20 December 2015).
potential losses of trade opportunities are already severe
punishment for those who conduct deviant behaviour.78
Other international institutions are more dedicated to
the codification of commercial customs and trade usa-
ges. The UNIDROIT Principles are regarded as a typi-
cal kind of private codification of transnational commer-
cial norms.79 The drafting process of the UNIDROIT
Principles is quite similar to CISG. A group of
renowned experts organised by UNIDROIT study
transnational commercial norms and codify them into
the UNIDROIT Principles. But, instead of pursuing
legally binding power from states’ recognition, the
UNIDROIT Principles exerts their influence through
their persuasive power and the authority of their issuing
organisation, the approach of which is quite similar to
the restatements of laws in the United States.80 The
UNIDROIT Principles inform judges, arbitrators, law-
yers and merchants about the current transnational mer-
cantile practice and provide them with codified transna-
tional commercial norms that can be readily used.81 The
UNIDROIT Principles can be directly designated by
contracting parties as the governing rules for their con-
tracts, provided that the application of the UNIDROIT
Principles does not violate the mandatory rules in corre-
sponding national laws. The UNIDROIT Principles
can also serve as the interpretative or supplementary
reference for national and international legal norms.82
Another noteworthy codifier at the international level is
UNCITRAL. Apart from the aforementioned function
of producing international legal norms in international
treaties such as CISG, UNCITRAL also plays an active
role in codifying transnational commercial norms
through model laws. But, slightly different from UNI-
DROIT, UNCITRAL, as a subordinate of the United
Nations, primarily serves for states. Its model laws pro-
vide suggested provisions as reference for national legis-
lators. Different from international treaties, states are
under no treaty obligations and are free to decide
whether to follow the provisions in model laws. Thus, in
a strict sense, the provisions in model laws are also not
binding legal norms in the first place, though they have
the potential to be legally binding if they are adopted by
national laws. UNCITRAL’s model laws cover various
78. B. Klein and K.B. Leffler, ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Con-
tractual Performance’, 89 Journal of Political Economy 615, at 633-37
(1981).
79. Calliess, above n. 8, at 474.
80. F. De Ly, ‘Lex Mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalisation and Inter-
national Self-Regulation’, in R.P. Appelbaum, W.L.F. Felstiner and V.
Gessner (eds.), Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of Global Busi-
ness Transactions (2001) 159, at 165.
81. G. Baron, ‘Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts Form a New Lex Mercatoria’, 15 Arbitration International
115, at 130 (1999).
82. R. Michaels, ‘Preamble I: Purposes, Legal Nature, and Scope of the
PICC; Applicability by Courts; Use of the PICC for the Purpose of Inter-
pretation and Supplementation and as a Model’, in S. Vogenauer and
Kleinheisterkamp (eds.), Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (2009) 21, at 25-29; A.M. Garro,
‘The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales
Law: Some Comments on the Interplay between the Principles and the
CISG’, 69 Tulane Law Review 1149, at 1149-1150 (1995).
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commercial fields, including international commercial
arbitration, insolvency, international payment, electron-
ic commerce and public procurement, which generally
receive positive comments from scholars.83 The UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration is one particularly successful example that has
been adopted by sixty-seven countries by now.84 With
the increasing number of states that are adopting the
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
the norms in this model law will be gradually accepted
as the universal rules for regulating international com-
mercial arbitration.85 However, it should be noted that it
is still unclear whether the success of the model law
approach in the field of international commercial arbi-
tration implies that this approach would be successful in
other fields too. Until now, UNCITRAL’s model laws
on other commercial issues have been adopted only by a
limited number of countries.86
3.4 Continuum between Legal and
Transnational Commercial Norms
From the emergence of the medieval lex mercatoria up
to today’s hybrid regimes for the governance of transna-
tional commercial transactions, both legal norms, be
they national or international, and social norms, be they
codified and uncodified, have constantly evolved in light
of the ever-changing needs of transnational merchants.
It can be found from the previous discussion that norms
in transitional commercial transactions, from a general
perspective, follow a continuum. From uncodified and
codified transnational commercial norms to internation-
al and national legal norms, the norms on the continuum
become increasingly precise, systematic, authoritative
and coercive.
In the middle of the continuum, the close connection
and constant interaction between different kinds of
norms render it difficult to draw a neat line between
83. For related literature, see e.g. S. Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement: An
Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard’, 53 Brit-
ish Journal of International and Comparative Law 17 (2004); J. Clift,
‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency-A Legislative
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border
Insolvency’, 12 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law
307 (2004); A.J. Berends, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview’, 6 Tulane Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law 309 (1998); A.B. Overby, ‘Will Cyberlaw
Be Uniform? An Introduction to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electron-
ic Commerce’, 7 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law
219 (1999).
84. See <www. uncitral. org/ uncitral/ en/ uncitral_ texts/ arbitration/ 1985
Model_ arbitration_ status. html> (last visited 1 June 2015).
85. M.F. Hoeellering, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration’, 20 The International Lawyer 327, at 339 (1986).
86. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency is
adopted by only twenty-two countries, available at: <www. uncitral. org/
uncitral/ en/ uncitral_ texts/ insolvency/ 1997Model_ status. html> (last vis-
ited 1 June 2015); the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
(2001) is adopted by only thirty-one countries, available at: <www.
uncitral. org/ uncitral/ en/ uncitral_ texts/ electronic_ commerce/
2001Model_ status. html> (last visited 1 June 2015); the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Public Procurement (2011) is only referred as the legal
reform guideline in fourteen countries, available at: <www. uncitral. org/
uncitral/ en/ uncitral_ texts/ procurement_ infrastructure/ 2011Model_
status. html> (last visited 1 June 2015).
them. To some extent, the norms in the middle areas
share the features of both social and legal norms. For
example, the provisions in the UNIDROIT Principles
are privately produced and not legally binding. But they
can be directly designated as the governing rules of
transnational commercial transactions and become legal-
ly binding for contracting parties. Similarly, UNCI-
TRAL’s model laws are also not directly binding from a
legal perspective. But the norms in model laws can indi-
rectly become legally binding when they are absorbed
into national laws.
From this perspective, norms in trade standards, private
codification and model laws and even international trea-
ties in a broader sense fall into the same category. They
are the products of the codification efforts of interna-
tional institutions. In a strict sense, these codified trans-
national commercial norms are not legally binding, but
they can be rather influential among practitioners and
voluntarily followed by them.
Having reviewed the main sources of social and legal
norms in today’s transnational commercial transactions,
the following sections go on to study how these norms
interact with each other through incorporation and
internalisation, what is the role of uncodified transna-
tional commercial norms in this interaction and what are
the challenges that put pressure on this interaction.
4 Incorporation and
Internalisation in
Transnational Mercantile
Practice
4.1 Incorporation and Internalisation between
National and International Dimensions
Today’s national laws still selectively incorporate trans-
national commercial norms. As noted by Fassberg,
transnational commercial norms in both uncodified and
codified forms are still important sources for national
laws.87 In essence, today’s interaction between commer-
cial norms at the international level and legal norms at
the national level is generally the same as it was in the
codification movement in the early modern era. Nation-
al laws can more adequately respond to the specific
needs of mercantile practice and become more attractive
to merchants by incorporating transnational commercial
norms.
Compared with incorporation, internalisation seems to
be less visible between national legal norms and transna-
tional commercial norms. It seems inappropriate to
argue that legal norms in national laws have little impact
on parties’ opinions in commercial activities. If a nation-
al law such as English Law or Swiss Law in Europe is
frequently selected by contracting parties in cross-bor-
der commercial transactions, internalisation will inevita-
87. Fassberg, above n. 43, at 72.
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bly happen as a result of transnational merchants’ repea-
ted compliance.88 For example, imagine that all transna-
tional merchants select one particular national regime to
govern the contractual relations between the parties.
Naturally, legal norms in this national regime would
become universal rules at the international level and be
gradually internalised by transnational merchants just as
they are at the national level. However, in reality, there
still seems to be no specific national legal regime that
takes a dominating position in the governance of trans-
national commercial transactions.
4.2 Incorporation and Internalisation within the
International Dimension
A more interesting type of interaction occurs within the
international dimension between codified and uncodi-
fied transnational commercial norms. Because of the
absence of a supranational government, it is unrealistic
to find a legislative body at the international level that
has the authority to produce and enforce supranational
legal norms that should compulsorily be followed by all
transnational merchants. But codified transnational
commercial norms can, to some extent, function as sub-
stitutes for supranational legal norms. Although interna-
tional institutions cannot directly transform uncodified
transnational commercial norms into binding suprana-
tional legal norms that have the jurisdictional power as
national legal norms, they can still study, refine and
incorporate uncodified transnational commercial norms
into codified transnational commercial norms.89
The incorporation of uncodified transnational commer-
cial norms into codified transnational commercial norms
produces a similar systematisation effect as the incorpo-
ration of social norms at the national level. Transitional
merchants may have difficulties in finding fragmented
uncodified transnational commercial norms without the
help of specialists such as lawyers and scholars. They
may also get confused about how to correctly use unco-
dified transnational commercial norms, as these norms
are normally general, vague and imprecise. However,
through the efforts of international institutions, once
unwritten, fragmented and vague transnational com-
mercial norms can turn into written, coherent and pre-
cise codified transnational commercial norms.90 These
codified transnational commercial norms can be easily
found on the Internet with multiple language transla-
tions. They are also accompanied by comments or
explanatory notes to instruct users on how to interpret
88. Empirical evidence shows that English law and Swiss law enjoy consider-
able popularity in cross-border commercial transaction in Europe. For a
summary, see H. Eidenmuller, ‘Regulatory Competition in Contract Law
and Dispute Resolution’, in H. Eidenmuller (ed.), Regulatory Competi-
tion in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution (2013) 1, at 2. For full
results of the survey, see Institute of European and Comparative Law,
University of Oxford Faculty of Law, Oxford Civil Justice Survey, availa-
ble at: <www3. law. ox. ac. uk/ themes/ iecl/ ocjsurvey. shtml> (last visited
on 20 November 2015).
89. Levit, above n. 76, at 190-91.
90. Baron, above n. 81, at 130.
the provisions.91 As a result, transnational merchants
could be less worried about where to find and how to
use these norms. They can simply select and use codi-
fied transnational commercial norms prepared by inter-
national institutions when necessary. This development
largely reduces the cost for transnational merchants of
using transnational commercial norms.
The importance of internalisation at the international
level is reflected mainly in its harmonisation effect.
Influenced by different legal traditions and mercantile
practices, merchants from different countries and juris-
dictions may disagree over the interpretation of certain
contractual terms, which may escalate into disputes if
these disagreements are not settled properly. As noticed
by many scholars, these disputes can be avoided through
the harmonisation effect of internalisation, though this
theoretical possibility has not been adequately tested by
empirical studies.92 Newly established legal norms can
be gradually internalised by individuals and function as
social norms in a community.93 This harmonisation
effect is also evident at the international level. When
transnational merchants repeatedly follow certain codi-
fied transnational commercial norms,94 they will gradu-
ally accept these provisions as the common reference for
interpreting contractual terms. Moreover, through
internalisation, transnational merchants may also gradu-
ally accept these unified transnational commercial
norms instead of insisting on their own countries’ com-
mercial customs and trade usages. By constantly follow-
ing codified transnational commercial norms, transna-
tional merchants’ different opinions derived from coun-
try-specific conditions can be gradually harmonised.95
As a consequence, this harmonisation effect can provide
transnational merchants with a common language in
mercantile practice and thereby reduce the possibility of
disputes fuelled by diverging domestic approaches to
transnational commercial trade.
91. For example, the main texts of UNIDROIT Principles (2010) and the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985)
are all accompanied by explanatory notes.
92. For the literature discussing the harmonisation effect from a theoretical
perspective, see e.g. Gomez, above n. 10, at 89-118; Wagner, above n.
10, at 77-87; P.B. Stephan, ‘The Futility of Unification and Harmoniza-
tion in International Commercial Law’, 39 Virginia Journal of Interna-
tional Law 743, at 743-98 (1999). See also related discussion in Section
2.2.
93. Ibid.
94. Soft codes, such as CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, have already
been listed as recommending governing rules for transnational commer-
cial transactions in model contracts of international organisations. See
e.g. Art. 5 (Applicable law and guiding principles), Model Contracts for
Small Firms: International Commercial Sale of Goods, International
Trade Centre (2010), available at: <www. intracen. org/ WorkArea/
DownloadAsset. aspx ?id= 37603> (last visited 1 May 2016).
95. This kind of bottom-up harmonisation can complement the top-down
harmonisation through international and national legislation. To some
extent, the bottom-up harmonisation can be more effective than the
top-down approach, as it directly affects transnational merchants, the
users of norms, rather than seeking a compromise between different
countries in international treaties and affecting transnational merchants
indirectly via the connections between national and international laws.
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4.3 Practical Challenges to the Development of
Codified Transnational Commercial Norms
and to the Incorporation and Internalisation
Processes
Theoretically speaking, the previous discussion indi-
cates that codified transnational commercial norms can
be useful in the governance of transnational commercial
transactions. Apart from the aforementioned merits of
reducing cost and preventing disputes brought by the
systematisation and harmonisation effects, codified
transnational commercial norms are also attractive to
transnational merchants with regard to neutrality and
commercial sensitivity. Since codified transnational
commercial norms are not tied to state authority, the
neutrality of these norms with regard to ‘nationality’ can
be guaranteed.96 Besides, codified transnational com-
mercial norms, following a bottom-up approach, are
essentially generated by transnational merchants them-
selves on the basis of their own mercantile practice and
can thus break the limits of national boundaries and
directly respond to the specific needs of transnational
merchants in international trade.97
The reliance on codified transnational commercial
norms in reality, however, seems to be less considerable
than expected. Empirical studies show that the usage of
codified transnational commercial norms, compared
with national legal norms, is rather limited in transna-
tional commercial transactions.98 In a more recent
Queen Mary’s international arbitration survey, around
half of respondents claim that they have, at least ‘some-
times’, used ‘transnational laws and rules’.99 But the
survey also suggests that codified transnational commer-
cial norms are normally used as a supplement to national
laws for interpretation and definition purposes. They
are seldom used independently as the main rules for
governing transnational commercial transactions.100
There are also a number of empirical surveys showing
similar results directly or indirectly.101
There are several reasons why the theoretical prospect
of codified transnational commercial norms seems to be
less promising in practice. First, transnational mer-
chants are still relatively unfamiliar with codified trans-
national commercial norms. Unlike national legal
96. Transnational merchants’ particular needs of neutrality in the governing
laws of contracts is evident in empirical surveys; see e.g. Queen Mary
University of London, 2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in
International Arbitration, at 11, available at: <www. arbitration. qmul. ac.
uk/ research/ 2010/ index. html> (last visited on 20 November 2015).
97. For example, long-distance transportation is quite common in transna-
tional commercial transactions, but less frequent in domestic transac-
tions. Accordingly, related issues regarding long-distance transportation
may be inadequately regulated in national laws, but more effectively
governed by transnational commercial norms. Sweet, above n. 5, at
632.
98. C.R. Drahozal, ‘Contracting out of National Law: An Empirical Look at
the New Law Merchant’, 80 Notre Dame Law Review 523, at 537-46
(2005).
99. See above n. 96, at 15.
100. Ibid.
101. See e.g. Cunieberti, above n. 11, at 396-404. For a useful summary and
comment on related empirical findings, see Vogenauer, above n. 10, at
36-60.
norms, codified transnational commercial norms lack
jurisdictional coercion.102 In domestic commercial
transactions, merchants are subject to the jurisdiction of
national laws and are forced to follow national legal
norms. The compulsory nature of national legal norms
significantly increases the possibility of internalisation
of these legal norms. However, international organisa-
tions generally lack the coercive power to force transna-
tional merchants to follow codified transnational com-
mercial norms issued by them. Second, compared with
national legal norms that have been developed for cen-
turies, modern codified transnational commercial norms
are still quite ‘young’. Their relatively short history can-
not provide them with sufficient time to perfect them-
selves. The relatively limited usage of codified transna-
tional commercial norms in practice also renders it diffi-
cult for them to be substantially tested in transnational
commercial transactions. To some extent, these obsta-
cles also lead to the relative immaturity of codified
transnational commercial norms, which in turn reduces
transnational merchants’ incentives to use them. Third,
there might be a principal-agent problem. Lawyers may
prefer to advise clients to choose certain national laws in
which they are specialised, though the suggested choices
of national laws do not necessarily best serve the inter-
ests of their clients.103
More importantly, all these practical obstacles not only
lead to the relative unpopularity of codified transnation-
al commercial norms but also hinder the interaction
between codified and uncodified transnational commer-
cial norms. Because of transnational merchants’ unfami-
liarity with codified transnational commercial norms
and their reluctance to use them, the internalisation pro-
cess will be inevitably prolonged.104 Meanwhile, the
limited usage of codified transnational commercial
norms cannot effectively increase the influence of inter-
national institutions among transnational merchants.
Accordingly, benefiting little from producing codified
transnational commercial norms, international organisa-
tions may have fewer incentives to continually dedicate
themselves to incorporating uncodified transnational
commercial norms. In general, the impediment to incor-
poration and internalisation may negatively affect the
systematisation and harmonisation effects and eventual-
ly hinder further development of codified transnational
commercial norms.
5 Conclusion
From a law and economics perspective, this article
approaches the norms in transnational commercial
102. Smits, above n. 64, at 9-10.
103. See Hachem and Schwenzer, above n. 50, at 464. But, of course, the
principal-agent problem can also occur in another direction. Lawyers
who are knowledgeable about transnational commercial norms may
also try to persuade their clients to choose them, though such sugges-
tions also may not be the best for their clients. See Cunieberti, above n.
11, at 406-21.
104. Cunieberti, above n. 11, at 384-96.
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transactions by studying the interaction between these
norms and the effects of the interaction on them. Roo-
ted in private or public mechanisms, the creation and
enforcement of social and legal norms follow different
patterns that provide them with different strengths and
drawbacks. But these differences can also be diminished
by the interaction between them. This interaction blurs
the boundaries between social and legal norms, bridges
the gaps between them and creates a common basis for
them to complement each other so that they can become
more efficient tools (in the sense of cost reduction) for
guiding individuals’ behaviour and maintaining social
order.
At the national level, the incorporation of social norms
and internalisation of legal norms can systematise social
norms, harmonise disagreements and enhance individu-
als’ compliance with social and legal norms. Incorpora-
ted social norms and internalised legal norms become
more systematic, unified and coercive so that individu-
als can better recognise, accept and follow them.
Accordingly, the cost of following and enforcing these
norms is reduced as a result of the systematisation and
compliance enhancement effects, while the harmonisa-
tion effect can gradually unify individuals’ different
opinions on controversial issues, prevent disputes
caused by these disagreements and thus avoid the
unnecessary cost incurred from these disputes.
The incorporation and internationalisation processes at
the international level tell a similar yet different story.
The systematisation and harmonisation effects still play
an important role in reducing the usage cost of transna-
tional commercial norms and reducing disagreements
between merchants from different countries. To some
extent, these two effects are more important and evident
at the international level than at the national level. Orig-
inally fragmented, imprecise and unwritten uncodified
transnational commercial norms are relatively difficult
for transnational merchants to use and follow. The sys-
tematisation effect of incorporation thus becomes cru-
cial for the spread and usage of transnational commer-
cial norms. Similarly, merchants from different coun-
tries may hold opinions that are more divergent than
those from one country. The harmonisation effect of
internalisation can thus play a part in unifying transna-
tional merchants’ views on contractual terms, reducing
the collision between them and avoiding the unnecessa-
ry cost generated from disputes.
But, different from the national level, the effect of com-
pliance enhancement is less visible at the international
level. The absence of a supranational government leads
to difficulties in establishing supranational legal norms.
Lacking the jurisdictional power of state organs at the
national level, international organisations cannot force
transnational merchants to follow codified transnational
commercial norms issued by them. On a voluntary basis,
whether these norms can be followed in practice
depends largely on the familiarity of transnational mer-
chants with them. But empirical evidence seems to sug-
gest that the development of codified transnational com-
mercial norms and the interaction between codified and
uncodified transnational commercial norms is more or
less hindered by practical obstacles.
Currently, codified transnational commercial norms are
still far from being a mature and complete body of rules
for the governance of transnational commercial transac-
tions. But the growing importance of these norms in this
field should not be ignored. Codified transnational com-
mercial norms are being recognised and followed by
more and more transnational merchants in practice. The
increasing usage of codified transnational commercial
norms is slowly but steadily forming a basis for their
further development. Accordingly, the harmonisation,
systematisation and even compliance enhancement
effects derived from the incorporation and internalisa-
tion processes can be expected in the long run.
It should be noted, however, that the findings of this
article are mainly theoretical reflections on the interac-
tion between norms in transnational commercial trans-
actions. Further studies, empirical ones in particular,
are needed to more accurately describe this interaction
and predict the role of codified transnational commer-
cial norms in the governance of transnational commer-
cial transactions. Although it is still too early to tell
which kinds of norms will take a dominating position in
this field, it can be expected that transnational commer-
cial norms, codified ones in particular, will continue to
complement and compete with national legal norms and
play an increasingly important role in the governance of
transnational commercial transactions.
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